Jeff Stamper, Aaron Stamper, David Stamper, Chirstopher Stamper v. Rebecca Johnson : Brief of Appellants by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Jeff Stamper, Aaron Stamper, David Stamper,
Chirstopher Stamper v. Rebecca Johnson : Brief of
Appellants
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kevin J. Sutterfield; Flickinger & Sutterfield; Attorneys for Palintiffs/Appellants.
Robert C. Keller; Willams & Hunt; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stamper v. Johnson, No. 20090062 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1483
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JEFF STAMPER, AARON STAMPER, 
DAVID STAMPER, CHRISTOPHER 
STAMPER, the heirs and children of 
SHARON STAMPER, deceased, 
PJaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
REBECCA JOHNSON, an individual, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No.: 20090062-^ <• A 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGE ERIC A. LUDLOW 
Robert C. Keller 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-4500-Fax 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Kevin J. Sutterfield (3872) 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD 
300 Esquire Building 
3000 N. University Ave. 
Provo,UT 84064 
Telephone: (801) 370-0505 
Facsimile: (801) 343-0954 
Attorneys for Appellants 
I , 
l*«ru 
UTAHAPF 
PARTIES AND COUNSEL 
APPELLANT: 
JEFF STAMPER, AARON STAMPER, 
DAVID STAMPER, CHRISTOPHER 
STAMPER, the heirs and children of 
SHARON STAMPER, deceased 
APPELLEES: 
REBECCA JOHNSON 
Counsel for Appellants: 
Kevin J. Sutterfield 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD, P.C. 
3000 N. University Ave., #300 
Provo,UT 84604 
(801) 370-0505 
(801) 343-0954 - Fax 
Counsel for Appellee: 
Robert C. Keller, Esq. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
(801)521-5678 
(801) 364-4500 - Fax 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THE FELLOW SERVANT DOCTRINE WAS NEVER INTENDED TO 
APPLY TO FACTS OF THIS CASE 8 
II. UTAH LAW DISFAVORS SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE 
ARE DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 18 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 25 
ADDENDUM 29 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH CASES 
Peterson v. Fowler, 493 P.2d 997 (Utah 1972) 1, 8, 9, 11, 18,24 
Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, (Utah 1976) 8, 11 
Bearden v. Croft, 201 UT 76, 31 P.3d 537 (Utah 2001) 1 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989) 1 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 4334, 436 (Utah 1982) 19 
Braegger v. Oregon S.L.R.R., 24 Utah 391, 396 (1902) 19 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) 2 
Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys., 32 F.3d 1450 (10th Or. 1994) 8 
Merrill v. Oregon S.L.R.R., 29 Utah 264 (1905) 19 
Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, LLC, 2008 UT 21, 182 P.3d 333 (2008) 2 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 760 p.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . . . 3 
Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1977) 18 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997) 1,2 
Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079 2 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rocks Corporation, 911 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1996) 2 
UTAH STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l) 3 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Did the district court err in determining that the undisputed material 
facts established that the Defendant and Plaintiffs decedent, Ms. Stamper, were co-
employees at the time of the accident giving rise to this action for wrongful death?. 
This issue was raised inter alia in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement (R. 118-158). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court reviews "the facts 
in the light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Bearden v. 
Croft. 201 UT 76, 31 P.3d 537 (Utah 2001) citing to Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 
779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989). 
Correctness is also the standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation. 
Id; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
Issue #2: Did the trial court misapply the law in concluding that Plaintiffs' 
claims for the wrongful death of their mother, as applied to the facts of this case, were 
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers compensation act? 
This issue was raised inter alia in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of 
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Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement (R. 118-158.) 
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. Toone v. Weber County. 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment the appellate court must determine 
whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court 
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Stephens Supra, 935 
P.2d at 519, quoting Wilcox v. Geneva Rocks Corporation. 911 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 
1996), quoting Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law that there were no 
genuine issues as to any material fact as to whether Decedent and Defendant were fellow 
servants or engaged in the same employment at the time of the crash and Decedent's 
death? 
This issue was raised in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgement (R. 118-158). 
When determining whether the trial court properly found as a matter of law that 
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact ast to whether Decedent and 
Defendant were fellow servants or engaged in the same employment at the time of the 
crash and Decedent's death the appellate court must review all facts and inferences in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the Appellants. E.g., Robinson 
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v. Mount Logan Clinic. LLC 2008 UT 21, 182 P.3d 333 (2008). Submission of evidence 
must be looked at in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc., 760 p.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l) 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive 
remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the 
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on 
account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be 
maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee. 
Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the employee's 
dependents, from filing a claim for compensation in those cases in 
accordance with Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal in a civil case from an order of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, entered December 11, 2008. (R. 
201-206.) Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal on January 9, 2009, and it was 
entered on the District Court's docket on January 12, 2009. (R. 207-208.) 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On May 6, 2005, Rebecca Johnson was driving a Ford Explorer owned by 
Gilbert Development south on 1-15 in Washington County, Utah at or near mile marker 
23. (R. 5) 
2. Sharon Stamper was a passenger in that vehicle. (R. 69, 125.) 
3. Johnson negligently failed to control the vehicle in that she ran of the right 
side of the road causing the vehicle to over turn. (R. 69, 125.) 
4. The Explorer rolled over one and 1/4 times and landed on the passenger 
side causing Sharon Stamper to die as a result of her injuries. (R. 5.) 
5. The auto crash in question happened in such an abrupt and unexpected way 
that Ms. Stamper had no opportunity to influence or exercise upon Defendant to use 
proper caution. (R. 145) 
6. Defendant while allegedly driving below the speed limit simply and without 
warning negligently failed to safely negotiate a turn in the road. (R. 145.) 
7. For several years prior and at the time of the accident, Sharon Stamper was 
employed by Gilbert Development Corporation ("GDC"), and Rebecca Johnson was 
employed by Diamond G Rodeos, Inc. ("Diamond G"). (R. 69, 120, 130, 155) 
8. Both GDC and Diamond G are closely held corporations largely or solely 
owned by Steve Gilbert. (R. 69-68) 
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9. GDC is a general engineering and general contractor company generally 
involved in heavy equipment leasing and land development. (R. 122, 69-68.) It has 
several offices, including one in Mesquite, Nevada and one in Toquerville, Utah. (R. 127, 
128.) 
10. Diamond G is a company which is involved in producing and providing 
services for rodeos. (R. 154). Its main office is in Toquerville, Utah, but some of its files 
are kept in Mesquite, Nevada. (R. 128, 127.) 
11. As an employee of Diamond G, Rebecca Johnson had work duties and 
specialized skills that were distinct from those of Sharon Stamper; including working 
with computers, welding, electrical work, and landscaping. (R. 143, 126, 67.) 
12. Additionally, Defendant Johnson was principally involved in work for 
Diamond G including traveling out of state for Diamond G to help produce rodeos by 
setting up arenas, checking on textures, sorting, feeding, watering and otherwise caring 
for the animals, as well as doing public relations work, data entry, compiling statistics on 
the animals, getting clowns and bull fighters, administering medications to the livestock, 
and used equipment. (R. 155-154, 146, 130-128, 126, 121, 66.) 
13. In contrast, Ms. Stamper was heavily and principally involved in cooking 
and cleaning. (R. 154, 143, 120, 67.) 
14. Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson sometimes worked together and overlapped 
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tasks, but were usually engaged in different tasks and work. In the 18 months prior to the 
crash, they often carpooled together from Toquerville to Mesquite. For example, Ms. 
Johnson would sometimes help transport records to Toquerville and then work on Gilbert 
development projects as directed by Mr. and/or Mrs. Gilbert. Johnson's duties for 
Diamond G. included general business errands and anything Gilbert needed her to do. (R. 
143, 67, 65-63.) 
15. For the six months prior to the crash, as an employee of Diamond G., 
Defendant Johnson drove between Toquerville and Mesquite almost every day, 
sometimes with Stamper as a passenger and sometimes without Stamper. (R. 146, 64, 
63.) 
16. On May 6, 2005, Johnson was expected to work on several specialized 
duties, some of which would benefit the businesses of Gilbert and Diamond G, and at 
least one of which would be of benefit only to Diamond G. Stamper was expected to 
cook, clean, and run errands. (R. 75-74.) 
17. Johnson was paid by Diamond G. on a weekly basis for her duties, whether 
she worked in Toquerville or Mesquite. (R. 155, 146.) 
18. When working on jobs where there was some crossover in job duties 
performed between Johnson and Stamper, neither person supervised the work of the 
other. (R. 152, 151, 143, 142, 120.) 
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19. Johnson drove any available vehicle and Stamper was always a passenger 
when they rode together. (R. 136, 130-129, 127.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court ruled that Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were engaged in the 
"same employment/' and that Plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. (R. 202.) 
The fellow servant doctrine, as identified and interpreted by Utah Courts, was 
never intended to apply to the facts of this case. Stampers' claims for the wrongful death 
of their mother, a passenger in a single car rollover, cannot be barred by the Workers 
Compensation Act. 
Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were not fellow servants or engaged in the same 
employment at the time of Ms. Stamper's death. Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were 
employed by different companies, had different skill sets, and Stamper had no 
opportunity to influence Johnson, the driver, to use proper caution in the short instant 
leading to her death. Under these facts, they cannot properly be considered fellow-
servants as defined by Utah case law. 
Assuming, arguendo, the fellow servant doctrine applies to this carpooling 
situation, there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The 
lower court ignored several genuine issues as to material facts when summarily ruling 
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Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were fellow servants or engaged in the same employment 
at the time of the accident leading to Ms. Stamper's death. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FELLOW SERVANT DOCTRINE WAS NEVER INTENDED TO 
APPLY TO FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Generally speaking, an employee of one company may make a claim for injuries or 
death against an employee of another company. The fellow servant doctrine has been 
recognized as an exception to that general rule in limited situations to prevent that 
recovery. The fellow servant doctrine requires that workers be in such co-association that 
they may influence each other to use proper caution and safety and be situated in their 
labor to the extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of each other as to 
skill, diligence and carefulness. Peterson v. Fowler. 493 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah 1972). 
A. Ms. Stamper was not in an position to influence Ms. Johnson in any 
way with respect to how she was driving and had no notice or warning 
that she was about to negligently overturn the vehicle. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Motion relied primarily upon three cases in 
making its argument for summary judgment, Peterson v. Fowler. 493 P.2d 997 (Utah 
1972); Bambrough v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286, (Utah 1976); and Goheen v. Yellow 
Freight Sys.. 32 F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994). These cases all involve dangerous physical 
work situations where workers were laboring side by side and where the injured parties 
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received their injuries as a direct result of trying to accomplish the ultimate task at hand in 
co-association with the defendant who was working with them. In Peterson, the deceased 
was working with others high above the ground on suspended scaffolding attending to 
ceiling tile when the scaffolding collapsed and he fell to his death. In Bambrough, the 
injured party was transferring lumber with another worker from one trailer to another 
when part of the load fell on him causing his leg to be amputated. In Goheen, the injured 
party was working with an other worker to unload a 2,000 pound crate from a truck when 
it fell on her thereby causing her injury. 
In these types of cases, the rule set forth in Peterson establishing what constitutes 
fellow servants may be logically applied to those relevant facts. Peterson states that 
fellow servants are those who "at the time of injury directly" operate "with each other in 
the particular business at hand," whose "mutual duties bring them into such co-
association that they may exercise an influence upon each other to use proper caution and 
be situated in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct 
of each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness." 492 P.2d at 1000 (emphasis added). 
The injured person in Peterson actually had the opportunity to "influence" the other 
workers, including those who assembled the scaffolding, to "use proper caution." 
Similarly, the injured party in Peterson was "situated in [his] labor to some extent as to be 
able to supervise and watch the conduct of [other workers] as to skill, diligence and 
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carefulness." Namely, he could observe the other workers as they worked and observe 
the construction and subsequent use of the scaffolding. 
Similarly, in Bambrough. the injured party could see how the other worker was 
approaching or planning the unloading of the lumber and was positioned such that he 
could make suggestions or otherwise "supervise" or "influence" how the unloading of the 
lumber was to take place. The same can be said of the injured party in Goheen with 
respect to the unloading of the 2,000 pound crate. 
The real test or inquiry in those cases focuses upon (1) the activities engaged in at 
the time of the injury, and (2) whether those separately employed employees had such co-
association at the time of injury to supervise, or influence safety or skill upon each other 
to prevent the injury. 
The facts in this case do not fall under the fellow servant doctrine. Ms. Stamper 
and Defendant were simply carpooling to a common job site when Stamper's death 
occurred. As indicated in Defendant's deposition, she was traveling ten miles below the 
speed limit on a road that she was very familiar with when she approached a right handed 
curve, in the rain, applied tapped her brakes, failed to negotiate the turn, and negligently 
caused the vehicle to roll. (R. 145, 139.) The trial court, when finding that the two 
persons were fellow servants, failed to properly apply the doctrine to the time of the 
injury and failed to consider whether Stamper had any co-association relationship at that 
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time to exercise control or influence on the driver. 
Ms. Stamper, as a passenger, had no opportunity "at the time of the injury" to 
influence Defendant to use additional caution or skill in the split second that the vehicle 
began to slide when only seconds prior Defendant was exhibiting adequate capacity to 
drive safely. 
Further, she was not in "direct operation with Johnson in the particular business at 
hand." Petersen. 493 P.2d at 1000. This scenario is not the type of scenario considered in 
Peterson. Bambrough. or Goheen, where workmen were engaged in common co-
associated activities at such a time and in such a manner that they were afforded the 
opportunity to influence the behavior of each other in their working environment at the 
moment of injury in an attempt to maintain their own safety. 
B. Defendant and Ms. Stamper were not Engaged in the "Same 
Employment" as Contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Bambrough held that fellow servants are those 
engaged in the "same employment." 552 P.2d at 1293. As discussed at length above, the 
court defines those who are in the same employment as those who can influence each 
other to exercise care, safety, skill, diligence, etc. 
In the present case, there is ample evidence that Ms. Stamper and Defendant 
simply carpooled to Mesquite together and then engaged primarily in distinct work I he 
act of these two separately employed persons carpooling together happened 3-5 times per 
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week for the prior 6 months, regardless of their duties on those days. (R. 146, 127) 
For example, Defendant stated in her deposition that, "I would take Gilbert 
Development files with Sharon to Mesquite and hand them over to Cindy. And then me 
and Steve would do Gilbert Development projects." (R. 138.) 
Here, Defendant indicates that it was normal for her to separate herself from Ms. 
Stamper upon arriving in Mesquite and then go and do "Gilbert Development projects" 
and some Diamond G work with Mr. Gilbert. In other words, Defendant and Ms. 
Stamper would carpool to Mesquite and then do independent assignments. 
The most illustrative evidence showing this division of labor between Defendant 
and Ms. Stamper is set forth in Ms. Gilbert's Affidavit, wherein she states: 
Friday, May 6, 2005, was to have been a "finish-up" day for moving from 
our previous home in Mesquite to the new home/office in the VDM 
subdivision. During the week of May 2nd- 5th either Steve or myself 
assigned [Defendant] a number of tasks in Mesquite, and those which I 
recall included: 
a. assisting me in getting Pacer up and running so we could do 
some legal research on the GDC California fraudulent conveyance case; 
b. getting the office telephone system up and running in our 
Chaparral Drive offices; 
c. teaching Steve and I how to use the telephone system once it 
was installed; 
d. picking up an "architectural variance" from the VDM 
Homeowners' Association for Steve's review and requested approval; 
e. determining what light bulbs would work only in our "old" 
house and leaving them at that home while bringing extra light bulbs that 
would work in the "new" home/office to that home; 
f. ordering flowers for a executive of Sun-Cor (the entity GDC 
was currently working for at Coral Canyon, Washington, Utah) who had 
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just had surgery; 
g. transporting mail and files to and from Toquerville; 
h. transporting legal supplies (bate stamp, discovery looseleafs, 
boxes for shipping, etc.) to the Mesquite office; 
i. handling logistical issues for the rodeo (i.e. acquisition of 
judging sheets from past rodeo/bull riding events, locating pictures of 
independent contractors for publicity, verifying hotel reservations for the 
Diamond "G" crew, etc.); and 
j . working with Steve as his emergencies required. 
Affidavit of Cyndi W. Gilbert. (R. 137-138, 75-74.) 
This list details specific chores or assignments that Defendant was to accomplish. 
In other words, this list describes the work or nature of employmeiil m which Defendant 
was engaged. In contrast, Ms. Gilbert's sets forth a list of chores or as assignments that 
Ms. Stamper was to accomplish: 
We had also sent Sharon to Mesquite during that week of May 2nd - 5th. 
Sharon had been working with my mother in cleaning the previous home 
and transporting items to the new home/office. Sharon had also been 
irreplaceable in helping me set up the my new office so that it would be 
ready for the Kleinfelder depositions the coming Tuesday. While Sharon 
worked for us, she also ran errands, picked up the mail, and did whatever 
was asked of her to help make our life easier. Among other things, Sharon 
and Becky were to ensure that a carpet cleaner was retrieved from the North 
Lakeview house for use at the house on Chaparral Drive, take a mirror and 
other items out of the Lakeview house and install a key box at the Chaparral 
Drive house. 
Affidavit of Cyndi W. Gilbert (emphasis added). (R. 137, 75.) 
Clearly, Defendant and Ms. Stamper had distinct assigmnent which they were to 
complete. Defendant had mechanical work, new phone set up and training, errands, light 
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bulb replacement, transporting mail, files and legal supplies, ordering flowers, and 
handling issues for the Rodeo. 
On the other hand, Decedent's tasks were almost entirely spent in cleaning and 
running errands. Carpooling to an office together, after which you separate, work with 
other persons, and do separate tasks requiring separate skills for separate and sometimes 
related companies, can hardly be deemed to be acting as fellow servants. At no time has 
Defendant argued that decedent did Diamond G Rodeo work. It was negligent driving 
that killed Stamper, which had nothing to do with any tasks of Johnson and Stamper 
which may have had some overlap later in the day in Mesquite. 
Further highlighting the distinction between the work and responsibilities is 
testimony by Mr. Steve Gilbert, owner of Gilbert Development and Diamond G Rodeo, as 
follows: 
Q. [By Mr. Sutterfield] I understand they were employed by different 
companies. You explained that to us, right? 
A. [By Mr. Gilbert] Well, Sharon [Stamper] has always been by Gilbert 
Development Corporation because she has cleaned the offices, and there 
are several offices. . . . And cooked for a lot of corporate — well, for 
almost — I don't think there was ever a corporate party that she wasn't over. 
And even if they were catered, she did all the setup. I mean there have been 
14 
times we've got three, four hundred people at the party. . . . And just a 
corporate deal And so she would set up the tables, make sure everything 
there is in place, and of course there was a place for Becky [Johnson], Fred 
and the ranch hands would jump in and help them set up corporate things 
for Gilbert Development, whatever. . . . But she's - Sharon1 s 4 
worketf lor < IIIIKTI Deu'l^iHiiuit juicf Uvt M always worked for the 
rodeo [Diamond G Rode] because Sharon took care of for the most part 
Gilbert Development Corporation, and Becky took c sire of;,;c llln^ rodeo 
do1 'ills anuj bullfightei s and things of that nature (emphasis added.) 
(R. 154.) 
It seems clear that Ms. Stamper was almost exclusively involved in cooking and 
cleaning for Gilbert Development while Defendant was almost exclusively engaged in the 
work of Diamond G Rodeos. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Gilbert testified that there was "continuous 
crossover" between duties assigned to Ms. Stamper and Defendant. Plaintiffs do dispute 
that in fact there was "continuous crossover" between the assignments given to fvIs. 
Stamper and Defendant, especially on the day of the crash. The depositions of Mr. 
Gilbert and of Defendant, when read as a whole, suggest that Ms. Stamper was usually 
involved in cooking and cleaning for Gilbert Development while Defendant was almost 
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exclusively engaged in the work of Diamond G Rodeos which included some overlap in 
common projects. See Johnson Depo. pages 19-27 and Gilbert Depo. pages 25-27. (R. 
120, 152, 128-126.) The fact that separately employed persons were involved in similar 
work in cleaning and organizing offices and transporting various files in both Diamond G 
and Gilbert Development does not make them shared or fellow servants under the law for 
injury claims. 
Additionally, Ms. Stamper and Defendant had widely varying skills sets which 
indicates that they actually did not do as much "crossover" work as suggested by 
Defendant. Defendant describes herself in her deposition as a "computer specialist" and 
indicates that she did welding, landscaping, electrical work, and data entry. Similarly, 
Defendant was heavily involved in rodeo production for Diamond G Rodeo. Defendant 
was engaged in a wide range of activities concerning the rodeo production including: 
feeding, sorting, unloading, vaccinating and scoring animals, marketing, and scheduling 
of clowns, See Johnson Depo. pages 12, 14-17, 19,28. (R. 130-128.) In contrast, Ms. 
Stamper was heavily involved in cooking and cleaning: 
Q. [By Mr. Sutterfield]: Was there a pecking order in terms of their 
relationship in terms of who was more of the boss? Were they on an equal 
footing if they did things together: Did you mostly rely on [Defendant] to 
direct the affairs of the work and tell her what to do or was it [Ms. 
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Stamper]? 
A. [By Mr. Gilbert]: No. [Defendant] had nothing to do with [Ms. Stamper] 
as far as direction. [Ms. Stamper] basically handled deiiuiii" off ires and 
taking care of catering for anything for Gilbert Development 
Corporation parties, cleanup after them, cook (emphasis added). [Ms. 
Stamper] did a lot of cooking either in Mesquite 01 1111 mr A lot of (he 
time, you know, large corporations will say we're going to have a meeting 
and we just eat it at the house and sit on the patio and talk, and [Ms. 
Stamper] v\ imid cook. She was a great cook. So she would cook and clean 
up and all that. But she had nothing to do with [Defendant]. 
Gilbert Depo. pages 25-26. (R. 20.) 
In short, the evidence suggests that Ms. Stamper and Defendant operated in 
distinct spheres, doing distinct work for different companies, and sometimes Defendant 
was engaged in minimal or nominal "crossover" work. 
On the day of the accident, "Becky and Sharon were again coming from 
Toquerville to Mesquite at [Ms. Gilbert's] direction to finish the tasks necessary to 
complete the office move." Affidavit of Cyncii \\ Gilbert. (R. 136, 75-74.) In sum, 
during the days leading up to the auto accident Defendant and Ms. Stamper were given 
distinct and separate assignments to assist in the move. Ms. Stamper was to finish her 
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assignments and Defendant was to finish her assignments. 
On the day of the accident, Ms. Stamper and Defendant began to carpool to 
Mesquite so as to finish their individual work. This division of labor is hardly the 
working situation, nexus in time, and manner of activities where influence and conduct 
can be effected relating to the injury contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
cases cited by the parties. 
Each woman had distinct tasks to perform. At the time of her death. Stamper had 
no opportunity to "exercise an influence upon [Johnson] to use proper caution and be 
situated in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of 
each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness . . . " Peterson, 492 P.2d at 1000. This is 
especially true when Defendant always drove the vehicle when she was with the 
Decedent. See Johnson depo at 21-22. (R. 136). "Sharon [Stamper] never drove." For 
the foregoing reasons, Ms. Stamper and Defendant may not properly be defined as 
"fellow servants." 
II. UTAH LAW DISFAVORS SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE ARE 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS. 
As the court is well aware, summary judgment is disfavored when there are 
disputed material facts and even when the understanding, intention and consequences of 
facts are disputed. Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1977). Similarly, when 
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considering a motion for summary judgment all facts must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Bowen v. Riverton City, d>6 P.2d 4334 436 
(Utah 1982). 
A. The Lower Court Improperly Granted Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment When Disputed Material Facts Exist 
Assuming, arguendo, the fellow servant doctrine applies to the facts of this case, 
there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The "fellow 
servants" doctrine is one based in common law. The Supreme Court of Utah has long 
held that while the definition of "fellow servants" may be a question of law, whether 
individuals of any particular case fall under that definition is generally a question of fact. 
Doubtless the question whether two or more servants, working for the 
same master, are fellow-servants, usually depends upon a variety of facts 
and is therefore a question of fact. The definition of fellow-servants, 
however, may be a question of law for the court, but it is a question of fact, 
to be determined from the proof, whether the case is such as to fall within 
the definition (citations omitted). In the case at bar the court stated the 
definition of fellow-servants in the language of the statute, and submitted 
the question whether, under the facts and circumstances in evidence, the 
relation of fellow-servants existed, to the jury. This was proper . . . 
(emphasis added). 
Braegger v. Oregon S.L.R.R.. 24 Utah 391, 396 (1902); See also Merrill v. Oregon 
S.L.R.R.. 29 Utah 264 (1905). 
In describing its reasoning in its Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, the lower court cited numerous facts 
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that it deemed to be undisputed. 
First, the lower court stated, "the course of dealing within the two closely held 
corporations demonstrates a substantial overlap between the duties of each employee 
performed." (R. 205.) In support of this proposition, the court cites to testimony by the 
Mr. Steve Gilbert, owner of Gilbert Development and Diamond G Rodeo, as follows: 
Mr. Gilbert testified about Ms. Johnson, "I will say she did Gilbert 
Development chores or intermediate stuff periodically all the time, but she 
got paid by Diamond G Rodeos. But there was continuous crossover. 
(R. 205.) 
Plaintiff does not disagree that Mr. Gilbert made this statement; however, 
Plaintiffs dispute that this characterization of Ms. Johnson's work is accurate. There are 
material facts that indicate that Ms. Stamper always worked for GDC doing cleaning and 
cooking type work while that Ms. Johnson was primarily and almost exclusively involved 
with Diamond G Rodeo affairs, which included, from time to time, work on GDC 
projects. Mr. Gilbert testified: 
Q. [By Mr. Sutterfield] I understand they were employed by different 
companies. You explained that to us, right? 
A. [By Mr. Gilbert] Well, Sharon [Stamper] has always been by Gilbert 
Development Corporation because she has cleaned the offices, and there 
are several offices. . . . And cooked for a lot of corporate — well, for 
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almost - 1 don't think there was ever a corporate party that she wasn't over. 
And even if they were catered, she did all the setup. I mean there have been 
times we've got three, four hundred people at the party. . . . And just a 
corporate deal. And so she would set up the tables, make sure everything 
there is in place, and of course there was a place for Becky [Johnson], Fred 
and the ranch hands would jump in and help them set up corporate things 
for Gilbert Development, whatever. . . . But she's ~ Sharonfs always 
worked for Gilbert Development and Becky always worked for the 
rodeo [Diamond G Rode] because Sharon took care of for the most part 
Gilbert Development Corporation, and Becky took care of getting rodeo 
clowns and bullfighters and things of that nature (emphasis added). 
(R. 154.) 
The record indicates that Ms. Stamper and Defendant had widely varying skills 
sets which indicates that they actually did not do as much "crossover" work as suggested 
by Defendant. See Johnson Depo. pages 19, 28 (R. 155, 154,146, 129, 128, 126, 66.) 
Defendant describes herself as a "computer specialist" and indicates that she did welding, 
landscaping, electrical work, telephone set up, and training. Similarly, Defendant was 
heavily involved in rodeo production for Diamond G Rodeo including: traveling, 
marketing, scheduling of clowns and bull fighters, scoring, and feeding and vaccinating 
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animals. I± In contrast, Ms. Stamper was heavily involved in cooking and cleaning: 
Q. [By Mr. Sutterfield]: Was there a pecking order in terms of their 
relationship in terms of who was more of the boss? Were they on an equal 
footing if they did things together: Did you mostly rely on [Defendant] to 
direct the affairs of the work and tell her what to do or was it [Ms. 
Stamper]? 
A. [By Mr. Gilbert]: No. [Defendant] had nothing to do with [Ms. Stamper] 
as far as direction. [Ms. Stamper] basically handled cleaning offices and 
taking care of catering for anything for Gilbert Development 
Corporation parties, cleanup after them, cook (emphasis added). [Ms. 
Stamper] did a lot of cooking either in Mesquite or in our. A lot of the time, 
you know, large corporations will say we're going to have a meeting and 
we just eat it at the house and sit on the patio and talk, and [Ms. Stamper] 
would cook. She was a great cook. So she would cook and clean up and all 
that. But she had nothing to do with [Defendant]. 
Gilbert Depo. pages 25-26. (R. 120.) 
In short, the lower court ignored evidence suggesting that Ms. Stamper and 
Defendant operated in distinct spheres, doing distinct work for different companies and 
only engaged in mhiimal or nominal "crossover" work. 
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The lower court also held that "the undisputed facts show Ms. Stamper and Ms. 
Johnson traveled together between various job sites during working periods frequently 
during six months preceding this accident." (R. 204.) However, the court ignored the date 
and time of the injury and evidence that upon arrival in Mesquite, Ms. Stamper and 
Defendant did distinct work with other persons upon arriving at those destinations. It is 
clear from the record that Defendant and Ms. Stamper routinely engaged in different tasks 
and work after carpooling together from Toquerville to Mesquite, and that these distinct 
tasks occurred during the week of May 2-5, 2005 as described by Ms. Gilbert's affidavit. 
These facts contradict the conclusion that Ms. Stamper and Defendant engaged in 
the same work after arriving in Mesquite or that they were or would have been fellow 
servants in their duties on May 6, 2005. Ms. Gilbert's own affidavit indicates, or at the 
very least raises issues of fact, that Johnson was intended to do separate work for 
Diamond G. Rodeo on May 6,2005, including: 
(a) getting the phone system up and running (benefitting both GDC and 
Diamond G) and training the Gilberts on its use; 
(b) determining what light bulbs worked in the two homes and office 
(benefitting both GDC and Diamond G); 
(c) transporting mail and files to and from Toquerville (benefitting both); 
(d) transporting legal supplies (benefitting both); 
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(e) handling rodeo logistical issues (benefitting Diamond G, Rodeo only) 
(emphasis added); and 
(f) working with Steve Gilbert as required (benefitting one or both entities). 
(R. 75-74.) 
Assuming arguendo, the fellow servant doctrine applies, the jury should be 
allowed to determine whether the relationship of fellow servants existed as to Stamper 
and Johnson's duties on May 6, 2005. (R. 149-147.) 
The lower court ignored these disputed facts and did not view them in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiffs as required by law. 
Ms. Stamper and Defendant are fellow servants if, among other considerations, 
they had "such personal relations" which allowed them to "exercise an influence upon 
each other of proper caution in respect of their mutual safety." This determination must 
be made "at the time of injury directly operating with each other in the particular business 
at hand." Peterson v. Fowler, 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1972) (emphasis added). 
While appellants believe this Court can determine the issue for correctness that the 
fellow servant doctrine does not apply to this case, assuming, arguendo, it has 
application, this type of fact intensive inquiry is precisely the type of question to be 
presented to a trier of fact. 
A jury could find that (a) because the death of Ms. Stamper was caused by the 
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sudden and unanticipated rolling over of a vehicle there would have been nothing Ms. 
Stamper could have done to exercise any meaningful influence upon Defendant with 
respect to "proper caution" or "their mutual safety"; (b) there did not exist such a personal 
relationship to allow such influence by Stamper who never drove; (c) the anticipated 
duties of each person to be performed on May 6, 2005 would not have placed these two 
separately employed persons in such co-association that Stamper could exercise an 
influence upon Johnson to use proper caution or to watch Johnson's conduct; or (d) there 
was insufficient crossover in their expected duties that day with Johnson primarily 
engaged in Diamond G. work and Stamper engaged in GDC office and home cleaning 
work. A positive jury finding on any of the four alternatives would defeat the fellow 
servant exclusion and allow Plaintiffs relief for the death of their mother. 
A jury should receive an instruction giving them the legal definition or test of what 
constitutes "fellow servants" and be allowed to apply the facts of this case in determining 
if Ms. Stamper and Defendant fall within that definition. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellants request this Court reverse the trial court's Order Granting Summary 
Judgment and rule that the fellow servant doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case. 
Alternatively, this Court should reverse the trial court and order the court to allow the 
Complaint to be amended to include Johnson's employer, Diamond G, and order a trial to 
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be held on the issue of whether the activities engaged in by the two persons in this case at 
the time of Stamper's death constitute them working as fellow servants for the same 
employer. 
DATED this / f f iday of May, 2009. 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD 
- > _ ^ 
Kevin J. Sutterfield 
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ADDENDUM 
1. A copy of the Fifth Judicial District Court's Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
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f l F T H DISTRICT COURT 
2006 DEC 11 PM I s 3 3 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, S3TAIE-QF-U3PAH 
JEFF STAMPER, AARON STAMPER, 
DAVID STAMPER, CHRISTOPHER 
STAMPER, the heirs and children of 
SHARON STAMPER, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
REBECCA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO AMEND 
Case No. 070500331 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
The Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend on October 22, 2008. Plaintiffs were represented by Kevin J. Sutterfield of 
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C.; Defendant was represented by Robert C. Keller of Williams & Hunt. 
The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel at the hearing and in the briefs, and having 
reviewed the motions, the pleadings, and the other documents in this matter, now rules as follows: 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." However, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," id. at (e) [emphasis 
added.] It is not sufficient, then, to merely offer an alternate interpretation of uncontroverted facts. 
The Court determines that the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant and 
Plaintiffs' decedent, Ms. Stamper, were co-employees at the time of the accident giving rise to this 
action. The Court notes, as Plaintiffs point out, that Ms. Stamper's paycheck came from Gilbert 
Development Corporation (GDC), while Ms. Johnson's came from Diamond G Rodeos, Inc., and 
that Ms. Stamper's work involved a somewhat distinct "skill set" from Ms. Johnson's, and vice-
versa. However, the course of dealing within the two closely-held corporations demonstrates a 
substantial overlap between the duties each employee performed. Mr. Gilbert testified about Ms. 
Johnson, "I will say that she did Gilbert Development chores or intermediate stuff periodically all 
the time, but she got paid by Diamond G Rodeos. But there was continuous crossover." (Steve 
Gilbert Depo. 57:20-23.)* In paragraph 10 of her affidavit, Ms. Gilbert states regarding the 
circumstances of the office move the week before the accident, 
While [Ms. Stamper] worked for us, she also ran errands, picked up the mail, and did 
whatever was asked of her to help make our life easier. Among other things, [Ms. Stamper 
and Ms. Johnson] were to ensure that a carpet cleaner was retrieved from the North Lakeview 
house for use at the house on Chaparral Drive, take a mirror and other item out of the 
Lakeview house and install a key box at the Chaparral Drive house. 
In regard to her job responsibilities, Ms. Johnson testified, "I pretty much did anything Steve 
[Gilbert] needed me to do, whether it was with Diamond G Rodeos or Gilbert Development, 
1
 Mr. Gilbert also testified in his deposition that though the women worked for different 
entities and had different duties, "There was overlap all the time" (27:17). When Ms. Stamper 
cooked for large corporate functions, for example, "Becky would certainly jump in and help ... 
with whatever Sharon needed" (25:7-8). 
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anything that had to do with animals, helping with the construction at his new house, running ... 
general business errands for Steve and/or for Cyndi [Gilbert]." (Johnson Depo. 12:8-13.)2 While 
Plaintiffs list a number of duties that Ms. Johnson was performed that were outside Ms. Stamper's 
expertise, it is not controverted that GDC's business was often mixed with that of Diamond G, and 
Diamond G's with that of GDC. 
More crucially, the undisputed facts also reveal that the accident occurred during a common 
errand at the direction of the employer. Ms. Gilbert's affidavit states, "The accident occurred on 
Friday, May 6th, 2005. On that day, [Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper] were again coming from 
ToquerviUe to Mesquite at my direction to finish the office move. [Ms Stamper and Ms. Johnson] 
often traveled together in company vehicles, and were driving a vehicle owned by GDC at the time 
of the accident," *[  11. While Plaintiffs characterize the trips from the ToquerviUe operation to 
Mesquite as merely incidental "carpooling," the undisputed facts show Ms. Stamper and Ms. 
Johnson traveled together between the various job sites during working periods frequently during 
the six months preceding the accident. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act is a legislative determination that its provisions 
should be an injured worker's exclusive remedy against her coworkers and employer in most cases. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l) states, 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and is the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil 
2
 Ms. Johnson also stated in her deposition, "I would assist Sharon sometimes in cleaning 
the house and running errands for Cindy" (27:12-14); and, "[A]s for ... working side by side, 
that's pretty much it, Steve, Cindy, myself, and Sharon"(28:20-21). 
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liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, 
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in 
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be 
maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer 
based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee.... 
[Emphases added.] In Black v. McDonald's, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court discussed the "in the course of or because of or arising out o f language. It stated, 
To be embraced within the ambit of "course of employment," the injury must be received 
while the employee is carrying on the work which he is called upon to perform or doing 
some act incidental thereto. Nadeau v. Town of South Berwick, 412 A.2d 392 (Me. 1980). 
It must occur within the period of employment, at a place or area where the employee 
may reasonably be, and while the employee is engaged in an activity at least incidental to 
his employment. Ski World, Inc. v. Fife, 489 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. App. 1986). The activity 
will be considered incidental to the employee's employment if it advances, directly or 
indirectly, his employer's interests. Id. at 75. 
Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were "called upon" to perform a particular task at the direction of 
Ms. Gilbert, benefitting GDC and Diamond G. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined fellow servants "as individuals engaged in the 
same line of work and labor together in such personal relations that they can exercise an 
influence upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect of their mutual safety. 
They should be at the time of the injury directly operating with each other in the 
particular business at hand, or they must be operating so that mutual duties bring them 
into such co-association that they may exercise an influence upon each other to use proper 
caution and be so situated in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and 
watch the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness." 
Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys., 32 F.3d 1450, 1452 (10th Cir. Utah 1994), quoting Peterson v. 
Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1972); in accord, Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). At the time of the accident, Defendant and Ms. Stamper were, in 
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carrying out the errand at Ms. Gilbert's direction, "directly operating with each other in the 
particular business at hand." The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Johnson and Ms. 
Stamper were engaged in the "same employment," and Plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred by 
the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend is moot and is DENIED. 
Dated this ______ day of December, 2008. 
tiJA-gJL-
JUDGE ERIC A. LUDLOW 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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